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But men may construe things after their fashion,
Clean from the purpose of the things themselves.
Shakespeare, Julius Caesar, Act I, Sc. Ill
In 1971, Donald Marshall, Jr. was wrongly convicted of the murder of Sandy Seale. 
Of that fact there can now be no doubt for it has been clearly established by the 
decision of the Appeal Division of the Nova Scotia Supreme Court on the 1982-83 
Reference, reported as R. v. Marshall,1 and by the findings of the Royal Commis­
sion on the Donald Marshall, Jr. Prosecution}  The question before the Royal 
Commission was essentially why did this miscarriage of justice occur. In one 
section of its Report, the Royal Commission focussed on the final six paragraphs 
of the reasons for decision of the Appeal Division on the 1982-83 Reference. In 
those paragraphs, the Court, having already determined to quash the conviction, 
uttered the now infamous opinion that “[ajny miscarriage of justice is, however, 
more apparent than real” and characterized Marshall as a perjurer and robber-in- 
waiting who had concealed vital evidence not only from the trial court but also his 
own trial counsel. The Royal Commissioners concluded that, by including these 
paragraphs, the judges of the Appeal Division had contributed to the overall 
injustice done Marshall by placing blame for the unfortunate sequence of events 
on Marshall himself, and inferentially found the panel members wanting in the 
proper execution of their duties. These conclusions, in turn, prompted the 
Attorney General of Nova Scotia to request that an Inquiry Committee be 
established under the federal Judges Act3 to determine whether the five judges, 
who had formed the 1982-83 Reference panel, should be removed from office.
The Inquiry Committee, with a mandate directed at that very determination,4 
found in favour of the judges. Criticism of the latter decision, which is the general 
topic of this comment, would normally begin with the institutional problem of 
judges judging judges. To my mind, this criticism is pedestrian — it is obvious and 
a cheap shot. After all, two of the three members of the Royal Commission were
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themselves sitting judges while the third was a retired judge. No more will be said 
about this. An evaluation of the Inquiry Committee’s reasons for decision poses 
more of a problem than that. In my opinion, the most significant factor to 
consider is why those obiter paragraphs were included in the reasons for decision 
in the first place. This is a question which is not directly considered by the Inquiry 
Committee.
Both the four member majority and one member minority opinions of the 
Inquiry Committee focussed on whether the content of the six paragraphs in issue 
constituted misconduct as to justify removal of the judges from office. The 
majority opinion stated the issue before it as follows:
Was it misconduct justifying removal from office for the Court to characterize the 
conduct of Mr. Marshall as it did having regard to all the circumstances it knew 
from the record which it had before it?5
This dry statement of the issue must be read through the prism of the majority’s 
test of “justifying removal” -  a test so qualified as to result in the removal of 
judges in only the most flagrant of circumstances:
Is the conduct alleged so manifestly and profoundly destructive of the concept of 
the impartiality, integrity and independence of the judicial role, that public 
confidence would be sufficiently undermined to render the judge incapable of 
executing the judicial office? [emphasis added]6
It should also be noted that the majority drew upon the “shock the conscience” 
test as indicative of the standard of conduct considered “so manifestly and 
profoundly destructive” to justify removal from the bench.
Having so formulated the issue and the controlling test, the majority 
determined that the six paragraphs reflected the honestly held views of the Appeal 
Division panel based on findings of credibility properly grounded in evidence. The 
majority, however, characterized the content of those six paragraphs as a “legal 
error” because of the one-sided blaming of Marshall rather than including 
comments on other factors which contributed to the miscarriage of justice. Having 
made such a characterization, the majority applied the singular presumption that 
judges should not be removed for “legal error.” This “presumption” is not 
necessarily as self-evident and unqualified as the majority would seem to believe, 
for it appears rather obvious that “legal error” amounting to incompetence or bias 
may well justify removal of a judge from office.
The minority reasons adopted the general test formulated by the majority but 
then proceeded to refute each of the conclusions of the Royal Commission and 
found no misconduct by the judges of the Appeal Division. I do not intend to
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discuss the conclusions of the Royal Commission nor the reasons of the minority 
in refuting those conclusions. I believe that it is sufficient for present purposes to 
simply point out that the minority reasons, while regretting the choice of language 
contained in the six paragraphs in issue, considered the views expressed therein as 
an exercise of the judicial task in providing comment “openly, directly and bluntly 
about matters that may be of public interest and importance.”7
I do not wish to be understood as disagreeing with the ultimate decision of the 
Inquiry Committee. To my mind, if the inclusion, simpliciter, of the six paragraphs 
in the reasons for decision of the Appeal Division was judicial misconduct, it was 
misconduct near the lower end of the scale. More serious misconduct is well 
known in Canadian legal circles. Examples include a judge regularly falling asleep 
during the hearing of important constitutional matters, a judge who regularly had 
the recording machine in the court turned off during Bible-based diatribes to 
abused women, and a judge who would swivel his chair around so as not to face 
counsel when he disagreed with the submissions being made. These are only the 
examples which come immediately to mind. Press accounts of an American judge 
making racial slurs and imposing stiffer sentences on minorities do not, fortunate­
ly, have a direct counterpart in Canada. In my opinion, the most interesting 
question is the motive behind the six paragraphs.
Both the majority and minority reasons of the Inquiry Committee stressed that, 
in argument by counsel, no improper motives were attributed to the Appeal 
Division as explaining the inclusion of the six paragraphs in issue.8 The question 
of motive was, therefore, not addressed by the Inquiry Committee. What was the 
motive for including the six paragraphs in the reasons for decision of the Appeal 
Division on the Reference? In the absence of testimony by the Appeal Division 
judges themselves as to their collective motives,9 the Royal Commission may have 
pointed to the answer when it quoted the following paragraphs from the factum 
prepared by counsel for the Attorney General of Nova Scotia and submitted to the 
Appeal Division on the reference:
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We are deeply conscious that criticism can itself undermine public confidence in the judiciary,
but on balance conclude in this case that that confidence would more severely be impaired by 
our failure to criticize inappropriate conduct than it would by our failure to acknowledge it. (at
Now what does that mean? Is it implicit that the members of the majority restrained their criticisms
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9MacKeigan v. Hickman, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 796.
It is the Respondent’s respectful submission that the role of the Court goes 
much further in this peculiar situation. Here, if the Court does ultimately decide 
to acquit the Appellant, it is no overstatement to say that the credibility of our 
criminal justice system may be called into question by a significant portion of our 
community. It seems reasonable to assume that the public will suspect that there 
is something wrong with the system if a man can be convicted of a murder he did 
not commit. A minimum level of public confidence in the criminal justice system 
must be maintained or it simply will not work.
For the above reasons, it is respectfully submitted that the Court should make 
it clear that what happened in this case was not the fault of the criminal justice 
system or anyone in it, including the police, the lawyers, the members of the jury 
or the Court itself.10
A causal connection between the invitation to vindicate the justice system and the 
inclusion of the six paragraphs so slanted against Marshall, though speculative, is 
too coincidental to ignore. The Royal Commissioners’ comment on these 
paragraphs, though guarded, is telling:
One cannot know whether...the argument [of counsel for the Attorney General] 
exonerating the judicial system convinced the Court to reach the conclusion it did.
(It would be a chilling indictment on the way in which justice was administered in 
this case if [counsel] accurately anticipated the need of the Court of Appeal to 
exonerate the system of justice before it would agree to Marshall’s acquittal.)11
Those who administer the justice system would do well to consider this “chilling 
indictment.”
It is, unfortunately, not too great an exaggeration to suggest that each day in 
the courts of every province and territory of this country and of every common law 
jurisdiction in the world, innocent accused persons are convicted because of 
institutional flaws and the instinctive and reflexive need felt by those in the system 
to defend it. Perhaps one of the most striking and common examples arises in 
situations of conflict between the testimony of a defendant and that of a police 
officer. Every lawyer knows that the defendant will be asked whether he or she 
has had any prior dealings with the officer or if any reason is known why the 
officer would want to “get” the defendant. When the answer to these familiar 
questions is “no,” the judge will be faced with an issue of credibility and 
reasonable doubt -  between the testimony of a self-interested defendant and a 
disinterested officer. Conviction normally follows. On appeal, the review by the 
appeal court will be tempered by deference to the trial judge who heard and saw 
the witnesses. The courts rely upon the good faith testimony and conduct of the 
police officers and counsel for the crown and defense. Our judges are passive 
arbiters in an inquiry for justice rather than active pursuers of justice.
Recent well publicized events involving police forces deserve consideration in 
relation to the justice in our justice system. The savage beating of a motorist by 
officers of the Los Angeles Police Department12 and the recent release in 
England of the Guildford Four in 1989, Maguire Seven in 1990 and Birmingham 
Six in 199113 raise serious questions as to the reliability of police and prosecutor­
ial conduct in the justice system. In the latter series of miscarriages of justice, it 
has now been revealed that pressure on police to solve a series of bombings in 
1974-75, in which a number of persons were killed, led police to fabricate evidence 
implicating the accused and prosecutors to withhold exculpatory evidence from the 
courts. These innocent accused persons also had their convictions reviewed on 
appeal but without success, in part due to appellate deference to trial judges and 
judicial belief in the good faith of police and prosecutors. In these three causes 
célébrés, persons identified by police because of religion and their place of origin 
in the north of Ireland became victims of the justice system and in the case of the 
Birmingham Six served sixteen years in prison before their release due, in large 
part, to the efforts of a few believers in justice.
These tragic situations cannot be permitted to continue. Nor can we afford 
to be smug in a false confidence that such events cannot occur here. The Marshall 
affair proves they can. Corrective measures though, are possible. In response to 
the unfortunate situation in England, Lord Scarman has suggested14 that serious 
consideration be given to (i) the creation of a forensic science service independent 
of the police which would report to and be under the control of the judiciary; (ii) 
adopting the civilian system of the investigative judge; and (iii) creating a special 
tribunal to review alleged miscarriages of justice which would function as a board 
of inquiry rather than within the limited scope of a court of appeal. These 
proposals have merit. At present, a Royal Commission is in the process of being 
established in the United Kingdom to examine the criminal justice system from the 
police to the courts. The final report of that Commission will not be of 
inconsequential interest to those concerned about the administration of criminal 
justice in Canada, particularly after its sad record in the case of Donald Marshall.
Nor stony tower, nor walls of beaten brass,
Nor airless dungeon, nor strong links of iron,
Can be retentive to the strength of the spirit.
Shakespeare, Julius Caesar, Art I, Sc. Ill
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